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THE ROAD TO REFORM IN THE WAKE OF KIOBEL:
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR
Sarah Coleman*
Jonathan Friedler*

INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of the corporation in America has led men of this generation
to act, at times, as if the privilege of doing business in corporateform were
inherent in the citizen; and has led them to accept the evils attendantupon the
free and unrestricteduse of the corporatemechanism as if'these evils were the
inescapableprice ofcivilized life, and, hence to be borne with resignation.'

On December 3, 1984, a tank housed in a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India exploded,
unleashing forty tons of deadly gas. The explosion killed 3,500 people within days and has
killed more than 15,000 people over the ensuing thirty years..2 The release can be traced back
to oversights and defective equipment by U.S.-based Union Carbide Company, which
immediately attempted to dissociate itself from legal liability for the tragedy. On March 24,
2009, the Exxon Valdez breached its hull after striking the Bligh Island Reef, spewing elevenmillion gallons of oil into the Pacific Ocean and resulting in widespread destruction to
environment, wildlife, and local industry.4 The cause of this accident has been attributed, in
part, to the helmsman improperly steering the vessel and the vessel having faulty safety
equipment.5 On April 20, 2010, BP's inadequate safety measures resulted in the largest
offshore oil spill in history. Its oil drilling rig, the Deepwater Horizon, exploded and was
"transformed into a column of fire," burning for almost two days and causing the oil well to
"vomit tens of thousands of barrels of oil daily."6 While the Exxon Valdez and BP oil spills
were catastrophic in their own rights, they do not compare to the destruction caused by oilproduction activities in Nigeria, where a group of nationals still await justice for decades of

* J.D. Candidates, 2014, Hofstra University School of Law.

Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part).
Bhopal Trial: Eight Convicted Over India Gas Disaster, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2010, 16:39 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south asia/8725140.stm (indicating that those campaigning for relief allege that the
death toll is closer to 25,000 and claim that the terrible effects of the gas release-including birth defects,
growth deficiencies, cancer, and other chronic illnesses-continue to this day).
Edward Broughton, The Bhopal Disasterand its Aftermath: A Review, ENvTL HEALTH, May 10, 2005, at 1,3,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMCI 142333/pdf/l476-069X-4-6.pdf.
4 Dan Fletcher, A Brief History of the Exxon Valdcz Disaster,TIME, http://content.timc.com/time/photogallery
/0,29307,1887217 1860791,00.html.
2

See id.; Stefan Lovgren, Exxon Valdez Spill, 15 Years Later: Damage Lingers, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS

(Mar. 24, 2004), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/03/0318_040318_exxonvaldez.html.
6 LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS,
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 1 (2012).
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environmental, social, and human rights violations. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. is
the result of a highly publicized conflict between Nigerian citizens and the Nigerian
government over the oil extracting practices of Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co. 8
The rise of multinational corporations ("MNCs") 9 has introduced many benefits
such as the creation of local jobs, the economic development of impoverished nations, and
advances in production and technological capabilities.'0 But the proliferation of MNCs is not
without costs, some of which include gross environmental degradation and violations of
domestic labor standards abroad." While these abuses are committed by MNCs in developed
countries throughout the world,12 some of the largest MNCs in the world are incorporated or
headquartered in the United States,' 3 and many foreign corporations conduct a substantial

See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111,124 (2d Cir. 2010), affd, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
In September 2002, Nigerian nationals filed suit under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), against Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. "alleg[ing] that defendants.. .aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing human
rights violations." Id. at 124. In 2010, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
dismissal, holding that corporations could not be held liable for human rights abuses under the ATS. Id. at 149.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that foreign victims may not bring ATS claims
against corporations for human rights violations committed outside the territory of the United States. Kiobel,
7

133 S. Ct. at 1669.
See Estelle Shirbon, Shell to Negotiate with Nigerians Over Oil Spill Compensation, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2013,
7:08
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/us-britain-nigeria-shell-idUSBRE98416920130905
(refering to the conflict as "one of the company's worst public relations disasters"). Estimates indicate that
over the past 50 years, 1.5-million tons of oil have been spilled in the Niger Delta ecosystem, resulting
destruction to biodiversity, and contributing to the impoverishment of local communities. Jonathan Brown,
Niger Delta Bears Brunt After 50 Years of Oil Spills, INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (Oct. 26, 2006),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/worldlafrica/niger-dclta-bears-brunt-after-50-years-of-oil-spills421634.html. Local activists protested the environmental deterioration engendered by these oil production
enterprises, admonishing Shell and the Nigerian Government.
Analysis, Nigeria, EIA,
http://www.eia.gov/countrics/cab.cfm?fips=NI (last updated Oct. 16, 2012). These efforts were met with
deadly force; during 1993 and 1994 Nigerian soldiers, with Shell's assistance and financing, committed acts of
violence against the Ogoni people, including "shooting, killing, beating, raping, and arresting residents, as well
as destroying and looting property." Corporate Court Grants Cert. in Human Rights Cases, ALLIANCE FOR
JUST. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.afj.org/blog/corporate-court-grants-cert-in-human-rights-cases. In 1995, nine
Ogoni leaders were falsely accused of murder and arrested. Karen McGregor, Ogoni Nine Hanged as
Indifferent
West
Failed
to
Respond,
INDEPENDENT
(U.K.)
(Sept.
19,
2000),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africalogoni-nine-hanged-as-indifferent-west-failed-to-respond-

699325.html. Following a controversial trial, which was "widely reported to be a legal farce," these activists
were convicted and hanged. Id.
9 An MNE is defined as follows: A combination of "companies or other entities established in more than one
country and so linked that they may coordinate their operations in various ways." JEROLD A. FRIEDLAND,
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS FINANCE 283 (3d ed. 2010). "MNEs produce more than 10
percent of the world's gross domestic product, conduct nearly two-thirds of global trade and engage in more
than three-fourths of worldwide research and development activities." Id. Relatively few corporate
conglomerates control a majority of the world's corporate power; fewer than 500 companies conduct more than
seventy percent of global trade. Id. at 284.
10 Id.

1 Id.; see also Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law the
Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 399, 403 (2002) (attributing most instances of large-scale environmental damage
to MNC operations).
12See FRIEDLAND, supra note 9, at 284.
13See
Anup
Shah,
Corporate
Power
Facts
and
Stats,
GLOBAL
ISSUES,
http://www.globalissues.org/article/59/corporate-power-facts-and-stats (last updated Nov. 12, 2011) (indicating
that, of the top 200 corporations worldwide, 82 are U.S. companies).
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amount of business in the United States.14 The Kiobel decision is a hot topic" for legal
scholars and the law governing MNCs, but, while there has been an influx of legal research in
light of Kiobel, most of the debate concerns redress for victims of MNC misconduct. A focus
on remedies, however, does not address the fact that these problems require proactive
resolution and avoids the question, "What is it about the nature of MNCs that induces them to
behave so badly?"
This Note examines the factors encouraging MNCs to commit egregious social,
environmental, and human rights violations. In doing so, it will address the nature of the
corporation, review current perspectives on corporate structure, and propose solutions for
healing the systemic ails of domestic corporate law. In analyzing the controversy surrounding
U.S. corporations, this Note posits that corporate conduct-whether good or bad-is a
byproduct of the law regulating firms incorporated in the United States. It takes the position
that corporate socially responsible behavior is implausible where laws and market forces both
empower and induce corporations to act in ways contrary to public policy, particularly in an
international setting where challenges to social responsibility are exacerbated. In response to
this analysis, this Note proffers a framework for reforming the modern view of corporate
purpose-wealth maximization and shareholder primacy-to a model of wealth maximization
for all stakeholders by way of combining long-term shareholder-wealth and social-value
maximization.
This Note is organized as follows: Part I provides a brief overview of the origins and
history of the corporation with a focus on the transition of corporate purpose from social
welfare to shareholder profit-maximizing engine. Part II outlines the corporate form and its
subsequent shortcomings with specific reference to how the current model induces
irresponsible behavior by domestic MNCs abroad. Part IlI examines the prominent models of
the corporate form: the shareholder primacy model and the stakeholder primacy model,
contemplating recent attempts to combine the two. Part IV analyzes the ideological
challenges of implementing reforms in line with the model accepted in Part III. Part V
proposes reforming internal and external regulation in such a way that will grant MNC
executives the necessary discretion to behave socially responsible while preserving a
regulatory element necessary to check corporate conduct in an imperfect market. The
conclusion advances the argument that domestic corporate law has been led astray by the
modern interpretation of the shareholder profit-maximizing norm, and that reformation geared

14 Robin Sabransky, Note, Barclays Bank Plc v. Franchise Tax Board: California 's Taxation of Foreign-Based
MultinationalCorporations,31 CAL. W. L. REv. 317 (1995).
is Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel, there was a circuit court split on the jurisdictional issue
raised in the case. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit held that corporations are not immune to liability under the Alien
Torts Statute (ATS). Sarci v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).
That same year, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, though dismissing plaintiffs claims, held that
corporations may be held liable under the ATS. Flomo v. Firestone Nat'l Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir.
2011), 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 18605 (2011). Corporate liability under ATS had also been upheld in the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Doe v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 654 F.3d II (D.C. Cir. 2011),
vacated, 527 Fed. Appx. 7 (2013). In April 2013, the Supreme Court held that the ATS was inapplicable to
violations of the law of nations in foreign territories. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013). Some commentators predict that victory for the defendants means that foreign victims who are denied
justice in their own courts may not seek redress for their injuries in the United States under the ATS. See Keri
Borkoski, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: What s at Stake andfor Whom?, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (Sept. 30,
2012, 9:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-whats-at-stake-and-forwhom/.
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towards requiring executives to consider the impact of their decisions on other stakeholders
can render social irresponsibility an unattractive option.
I. The History of the Corporation: From Public Purpose to Profit-Maximizing
An understanding of what businesses are is fundamental to appreciating corporate
behavior. " The following discussion will describe the origins of the corporate form in the
United States and the events leading to the current shareholder profit-maximizing norm.
In the United States, the power to grant corporate charters and establish corporations
is reserved by the individual states.17 Each corporate charter is granted on a case-by-case
basis by actions of the state legislature, outlining the specific public purposes being
promoted." The concept of corporations existing as creatures of the state is rooted in colonial
history.' 9 The corporation in colonial America "was first and foremost a political expression
performing a public economic function."20
Originally, the predominant characteristic of these corporations was this inherently
public purpose 2 1-these entities were "conceived as . . . agenc[ies] of the government,
endowed with public attributes, exclusive privileges, and political power, and designed to
serve a social function for the State." 22 The act of incorporation bestowed special privileges
upon the entity such as limited liability.23 The privileges of the corporate form were,
however, "premised on the social services they rendered: the dedication of private capital and
entrepreneurial effort to the public interest." 24 The grant of corporate privileges was not
deemed justifiable without conferring the benefit of needed public service in return.25
As the nineteenth century progressed, and the industrial revolution reached full
swing, states were overwhelmed with requests for incorporation. 26 In recognition of the

See UNSW Australia, Corporate Governance-What Do Shareholder Really Value?, YOUTUBE (Dec. 12,
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-s5Eoy988728 (featuring Professor Lynn Stout).
1 Lucian Aryc Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
CorporateLaw, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1442-43 (1992).
" NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN, SOCIAL STRATEGY AND CORPORATE STRUCTURE 1, 2 (1982).
'9 Id. at 1.
20 Id. In contrast to projects of public concern, "[t]he purely private business affairs of
the colonists, more
restricted in scale and scope, were carried on chiefly by individuals or by unincorporated joint-stock companies
of a local nature." Id.
21 Thomas B. Byrne, False Profits: Reviving the Corporation's Public Purpose, 57 UCLA L. REV. 25, 27
1

(2010) ("a brief survey of history of corporate history reveals that although a corporation is a commercial
enterprise, it was traditionally one that also served public goals").
22CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 18, at 2 (quoting Oscar Handlin) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23See Ronald Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditionaland Progressive CorporateLaw via an
Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J. CORP. L. 247, 252 & n.29 (2008) ("The attractiveness of the
corporate form stemmed largely from (and continues to stem largely from) the limited liability protection it
affords investors.").
24 CHAMBERLAIN, supranote 18, at 2.
25 JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT BUSINESS

COMBINATIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 269 (1961) ("[It was not considered
justifiable to create corporations for any purpose not clearly public in nature; each application was considered
by itself, and if favorably was followed by a legislative act of incorporation.").
26 See CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 18, at 2.
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social value of increasing private enterprise2 7 and in order to ease complaints of favoritism in
the corporate charter process,28 states began to adopt general incorporation statutes.2 As a
result, anyone who satisfied the procedural requirements was now allowed to organize a
corporation, but the statutes continued to impose many restrictions on corporate financing and
structure. 30 Furthermore, "the notion that public purpose was served by private profit seeking
gave ample rationale to this more open access to the corporate form, with its attendant
advantages." 3'
Prior to general incorporation statutes, the corporate form was considered to be a
privilege bestowed by the state, and, consequently, the role of the state as a rightful regulator
of the corporate entity it created was not questioned. 32 Towards the end of the nineteenth
century, however, the view that states create corporations was "eroded by those who argued
that the corporation was a 'natural' mode of business organization." 3
II. The Modern Corporation: Current Framework, Benefits, and Shortcomings
Today, "[e]ven though it would seem obvious that corporations should be created
only if they, on balance, create more benefit than harm, this principle is largely absent from
corporate law doctrine, judicial opinions, corporations casebooks, and business courses in
both law and business schools." 34 For the most part, public concerns and interests are ignored
unless they are taken into consideration for marketing or public relation reasons in order to
maximize long-term shareholder profits."
For many reasons, challenges to inducing corporate social responsibility can largely
be attributed to the modem corporate form. There are several ways to organize a business:
the corporation is only one of them. As modem business activity grows in both scale and
complexity, the corporate form has become something of a necessity.36 In large, public
corporations individuals come together, each bringing something different to the table.

See id. at 3 (acknowledging that all businesses serve the public interest in the sense that they are capabic of
increasing the aggregate wealth of society).
21 See id. (pointing out "the practice of issuing corporate charters by special legislative
act came to be viewed
with suspicion and distaste . ... it smacked of privilege: individuals with well-placed contacts, favorable social
standing, and economic advantage clearly had an inside track on a state's grant of corporate rights.").
29 Id. at 3. For example, in 1889 New Jersey adopted liberal corporation statute, which
allowed corporations to
27

exist "for any lawful business or purpose whatever."

KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW

29, 35 (2012). Other states soon followed New Jersey's lead, which led to what some commentators describe as
a "race to the bottom" ultimately resulting in the disbandment of many previous limitations on corporations.
Id.
3 GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 35.
' CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 18, at 3 (pointing out that "every business was of public importance in the
respect that it might increase the aggregate wealth of society [indicating] private enterprise had become public
purpose.").
32 See GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 35.
33 Id.

" Id. at 128 (noting that "occasionally one will come across a resource that does consider the corporation's
responsibility to the societal good, but for the most part, judges and mainstream corporate law scholars take
shareholder supremacy as the lodestar.").
3s Id.
36 DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 98 (David L. Shapiro et al. cds., 1986)
(indicating that over 90% of the industrial production in the United States are corporations).
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Investors bring capital to fund operations, managers bring experience and judgment, and
workers make the product or provide the service. This combination makes the organization
much more effective than each individual would be operating on his own. For these reasons,
when the intricacies of production require a combination of specialized skills and large
quantities of capital, the corporation is the optimal form of organization.37
A. CorporatePersonhood

An important characteristic of the corporation under U.S. law is its status as a legal
person. Many feel that the corporation is a separate legal person distinct from its managers
As Justice Rutledge observed in United States v. Scophony Corp. of
and shareholders.
America, this forces our law to analyze some elements of corporations in the way it reviews
the behaviors of natural persons, which could be viewed as an attempt to drive a square peg
into a round hole.39 The doctrine of corporate personhood takes its root in a case nearly two
hundred years old in which the Supreme Court held that corporations share with natural
persons the rights to enter and enforce contracts.40 Corporate personhood was more properly
established decades later when the Supreme Court heard a case involving a railroad
company's refusal to comply with new state tax law.41 The court reporter included Chief
Justice Waite's commentary prefix to the court record, where he stated: "The court does not
wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does." 42
Because the remark was in a headnote, 43 however, it did not have the force of law."4 This was
changed two years later by a case in which the Supreme Court held that "[u]nder the
designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is included . . . . 'The great

object of a corporation is to bestow the character and properties of individuality on a
collective and changing body of men."' 45 The holding secured for corporations the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment,46 and has been affirmed on numerous occasions
n7 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 9394(1985).
38 See First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comcrcio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 625 (1983)
(acknowledging that separate legal personhood is "an almost indispensable aspect of the public corporation.").
' See 333 U.S. 795, 803 (1948).
40 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 650 (1819).
41 Santa Clara Cnty. v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., I18 U.S. 394 (1886).
42 Id. at 396.
43 Critics maintain that this ruling never occurred: "The 'corporations are persons' ruling was a fiction created
by the court's reporter. He simply wrote the words into the headnote of the decision. The words contradict
what the court actually said." Thom Hartmann, Dinosaur War, ECOLOGIST, Dec./Jan. 2002, at 21, 23; see also
Josh Clark, Why Do Corporations Have the Same Rights as You?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Apr. 1, 2008),
http://money.howstuffworks.com/corporation-personI.htm. The source notes that the court reporter's inclusion
of this remark is suspicious because this was not how the court ruled in the case at all. Id. The source also
indicates that the court reporter was a former railroad president, which makes the inclusion of the headnote
even more suspicious. Id.
4 Clark, supra note 43.
4 Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Com. of Pa., 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888) (quoting Chief
Justice Marshall).
46 Clark, supra note 43.
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ever since.4 7 It has been argued that application of this principle, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court's holding in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm 'n.,48 has permitted
corporations to use their influence in obtaining political representation that best suits their
interests to the detriment of natural persons.4 9
B. Limited Liability
In other forms of business organizations, such as a general partnership, those who
invest in the enterprise expose themselves to unlimited liability for its conduct.50 The
individual partners in a partnership are responsible for any debts incurred by the partnership
entity.5 1 By contrast, shareholders are not responsible for the obligations of the corporation:
the corporate entity itself iS.5 2 Those who invest in a corporation are liable to its creditors
only to the extent of their investment. This means that a person who wishes to invest $500
in a company risks only that money and no more in the event that the company becomes
liable to a creditor for a much larger sum. 5 4 Subject to a few exceptions, 55 limited liability
ensures that such creditors can enforce their claims only against the company's assets, even if
the amount to which they are entitled exceeds the value of those assets.5 6 Additionally, and
again, subject to exceptions, those directly involved in the firm's operations (managers,
employees) are not vicariously liable for its conduct.5 7 Under the protection of limited
liability, no one puts at risk any more than he or she invests," and it is for this reason that
59
limited liability is necessary for large, public corporations to exist.
Limiting the liability of investors allows corporations to aggregate the large amounts
of capital necessary to fund operations of their size. It achieves this task by first limiting risk,
a universal element of businesses, big or small. Without limited liability, any investment in a

See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 536 (1933) ("Corporations are as much entitled to the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as are natural persons."); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v.
Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889) ("[W]c admit the soundness of his position, that corporations are persons within
the meaning of the clause [the Fourteenth Amendment] in question.").
" 558 U.S. 310 (2010), overruling McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). In Citizens United, the court held that restrictions on political spending by
corporations were unconstitutional violations of corporations' First Amendment rights of free expression. Id.
' See Robert Koehler,
Corporate Personhood, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2010, 5:15 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kochler/corporate-personhood-b 433615.htmi (posting a press release
issued by the Alliance for Democracy).
5o See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L., 479, 490 n.45 (2001). But see
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 37, at 90 (positing that, in all forms of business organizations, limited
liability is actually the rule and that cases of unlimited liability are rare).
51 Bainbridge, supra note 50, at 490 n.45.
52 David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 371, 371 (1981).
1 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 37, at 89.
s Id. at 90.
5s See Sca-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991).
56 David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56
EMORY L.J. 1305, 1346 (2007).
57 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limited Liability Companies § 16 (2013) (indicating that, in corporations and limited
liability companies, limited liability applies to those who manage the organization's affairs).
s' Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 37, at 89-90.
' Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259, 262 (1967).
4
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company, regardless of how big or small, could expose an investor to unlimited liability.
Suppose a wealthy individual wanted to invest a few hundred thousand dollars in an oilproduction business venture. This investment, though only a small portion of this person's
total assets, would place at risk the millions of dollars in assets that she has not invested in the
company. If, by some accident (oil spill, factory explosion, nuclear meltdown), the
company's operations caused millions of dollars in damage, those who could pursue a claim
against the oil company would also be able to pursue their claims against the individual's
personal assets if the company's assets were unable to fully compensate the victims. The
investor might also be personally pursued by a vendor to whom the company owes money or
to creditors in the event that the company goes bankrupt. Such scenarios make it
prohibitively risky for those with large amounts of wealth to make the sort of investments
large-scale companies need to fund their operations. This puts those capable of funding
enterprises in the position of having to choose between two extremes: investing everything
they own in a business or not investing at all. With the protection of limited liability, people
are motivated to invest in companies in the hopes that their investment will pay off without
being deterred by the prospect of staking everything they own to that investment.
The very concept of limited liability, however, creates a moral hazard that is at odds
with Corporate Social Responsibility ("CSR").6 On the one hand, principles of tort and
product liability exist to deter risky behavior and to induce corporate actors to exercise the
proper amount of care in preventing harm to others.6 If one can expect to be held fully
accountable for the consequences of her actions, she will be less likely to risk acting in a way
that could cause harm to others. On the other hand, limited liability functions as an incentive
for people to invest in risky ventures. By being an attractive feature for those who
specifically want to avoid liability for behavior that is likely to cause damage to others,
limited liability creates both the incentive and the means to do so. Thus, eliminating
shareholder liability beyond the extent of investment allows managers to make riskier
business decisions, which tend to result in either reaping great rewards or causing severe
damage to others, by making such a risk worth taking. 61
For these reasons, a principle such as limited liability, if unchecked, would give rise
to some serious concerns regarding corporate conduct. After all, some enterprises involve a
degree of danger, and accidents not only occur, but they may be very expensive to remedy.
Unlike those who choose to transact with a particular corporation, one who sustains an injury
in the course of operations is an involuntary creditor. Limited liability has the potential to
remove the social costs of these accidents from the calculations of corporate decisionmakers. 63 These individuals may also protect themselves from their obligations to parties
who have voluntarily contracted with the corporation. Unrestrained, limited liability would
permit a group of natural persons to shield themselves behind a corporate entity to which they
have contributed no assets and then conduct business in such a way that harms others, leaving
their victims with nothing more than a judgment against an entity whose insolvency renders it
judgment proof. Likewise, a large parent-corporation could create or buy a subsidiary and
transfer all of the subsidiary's assets into the parent, reducing the subsidiary to nothing more,

See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1565
(1991).
61 Id.
62 Phillip 1. Blumberg, Limited Liabilityand Corporate Groups, II J. CORP.
L. 573, 616 (1986).
60

63

Leebron, supra note 60, at 1568.
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than an asset-deficient, corporate shell. If limited liability extended to this situation, parties
that subsequently transact with the subsidiary would have no recourse against it in the event
its debts became outstanding and its owner, the parent corporation, would be shielded from
liability for those debts."' Indeed this is precisely what some corporations have attempted to
do in an effort to avoid accounting for their obligations. 65
The laws of the United States prevent this sort of exploitation by refusing to extend
the protective shield of limited liability to corporations who conduct business irresponsibly.
Under the doctrine of "Piercing the Corporate Veil," courts have the equitable power to
disregard the legal fiction that is the corporation's entity status and hold its owners personally
liable where the facts demonstrate that the corporation is merely the "alter-ego" of its owners
and circumstances are such that "adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence
would sanction a fraud or promote injustice."66 Courts have defined "alter-ego" to represent
that situation where there is "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual [or other corporation] no longer exist."67
The court in Sea-Land Services, hc. v. Pepper Source highlighted four factors to be

considered in determining whether disregard of corporate identity is justified. These factors
are: "(1) the failure to maintain adequate corporate records or to comply with corporate
formalities, (2) the commingling of funds or assets, (3) undercapitalization, and (4) one
corporation treating the assets of another corporation as its own."68
The doctrine of corporate veil piercing flows in the vein of requiring responsible
corporate conduct-it is the law's recognition that there is a point at which the benefit of
having corporations is outweighed by the competing factor of fairness to those who incur
damages in dealing with them. This line is drawn because the courts will not condone
conduct that inflicts uncompensated harm on others by extending the incentive to continue
doing so. Rather, corporate veil piercing provides a strong incentive for corporations to
consider the costs of their accidents in their operations, as opposed to permitting these
externalities to be absorbed by others.
However, the doctrine has never been applied to a publicly held corporation. As a
practical matter, it does not affect the conduct of large corporations and is functionally
irrelevant to MNCs. 70

See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1991).
id.
66 Id. (piercing the corporate veil of limited liability where defendant's assct-deficient
corporation owed
plaintiff-carrier expenses for shipping services); see Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565,
569-70 (7th Cir. 1985) (piercing the veil of limited liability where a corporation with no assets purchased cans
and labels from plaintiff-vendor to be used by another corporation, dominated by the same individual).
67 Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 941 F.2d at 520; Van Dorn Co., 753
F.2d at 569-70.
68 Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 941 F.2d
at 520.
69 But see Barber, supra note 52, at 373 ("Given the purpose of promoting commerce
by providing limited
liability for shareholders in state corporate law, courts have been reluctant to pierce the corporate veil, even
when the express purpose of incorporation was to limit the liability of the incorporators." (citing Burns v.
Norwesco Marine, Inc., 535 P.2d 860, 862 (1975))).
7o The doctrine has only been applied to closely held corporations and parent-subsidiary corporations, where
the roles of ownership and control intertwined, and the factors giving rise to a "unity of interest and ownership"
are likely to exist. 'Barber, supra note 52, at 372-73.
64

61 See
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C. Corporationsand the States: The Race to the Bottom and the InternalAffairs
Doctrine

As a result of the economic benefits attendant with corporate activity, the states
compete with one another for corporate charters. Moreover, states whose laws fail to attract
corporations forsake the measure of social and economic stability-and taxes and the
franchising fees associated with corporations. This could give rise to a snowball effect, as
people generally prefer to live in places of social and economic stability and-if they are able
to do so-may move to one when they find that they do not. 72 Put simply, companies
incorporate where the laws favor them and people follow. Under the "race to the bottom"
theory of state competition for corporate charters, states are pressured into adopting relaxed
laws that encourage companies to incorporate within them in order to prevent the exodus of
corporations, and thus its citizens.74 While this theory has been criticized for failing to
consider the impact that market forces have in discouraging companies from incorporating in
states with relaxed laws, 7 the market forces on which race to the top theorist rely do not
entirely curtail management's pursuit of corporate law rules that are undesirable to
shareholders. 76 Though states are not entirely helpless against corporate influence, their laws
must be flexible enough to permit a degree of corporate encroachment on society, and may

7n Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1438.
72 See Katherine Q. Scelyc, Detroit Census Confirms a Desertion Like No Other,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011,

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23detroit.html?_r=1 & (reporting that in the past decade residents of
Detroit have been deserting the failing city at an unprecedented rate, and attributing these losses to "the travails
of the auto industry and the collapse of the industrial-based economy); see also Liu Dan, Economic, Social
Stability
Key
to
China's
Development,
NEWS.XINHUANET.COM
(Dec.
19
2011),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepthl2011-12/19/c_131314562.htm (suggesting that social and economic
stability improves peoples' livelihoods in general).
73 More specifically, the laws that states are pressured to adopt "are too lax with respect to managers and
controlling shareholders" whose decisions govern how the company operates and who also benefit by
exploiting shareholders. Bcbchuk, supra note 17, at 1444. The competing "race to the top" theory holds that
state competition actually induces states to establish laws that benefit shareholders. Id. at 1445. Under this
theory, shareholder and manager interests align because lax laws that permit shareholder exploitation render
corporations vulnerable to hostile takeovers, which can result to management losing their jobs. Id. Thus, this
threat to management discourages managers from incorporating under legal regimes that permit exploitation of
shareholders. Id.
7 Id. at 1443; see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the
Botton/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 381, 387 (2005).
7s Bcbehuk, supra note 17, at 1444-45.
76 See id. at 1446 (pointing to state antitakeover rules to illustrate this position). Many race to the top
proponents deem antitakeover statutes to be inefficient. Id. However, many states have adopted antitakeover
statutes. Id. This frustrates the principle on which race to the top theorists rely-that competition leads states to
create "presumptively efficient" corporate law-because antitakeover statutes are popular among states despite
their alleged inefficiency. Id. at 1445-46. While some scholars argue that antitakeover statutes are an anomaly,
Bebchuk takes the position that they are "a manifestation of a more general problem," id. at 1469 n.l 16, and
that, in order to remain competitive, states will adopt rules, such as antitakeover statutes, that "weaken the
disciplinary force of the market for corporate control," id. at 1469.
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not represent how they would otherwise govern;n failure to do so will result in the loss of
valuable corporate dollars, as businesses will choose to incorporate elsewhere.7 8
Because a corporation, like a natural person, is free to domicile in the state of its
choice, it will select the state harboring the legal regimes most favorable to its operations.
This freedom to shop for a favorable domicile raises obstacles for CSR, as it creates major
incentives for companies to incorporate in states whose laws least conflict with their business.
This means that states adhering to stricter corporate regulations in order to prevent
exploitation of its citizens, resources and environment will deter those companies whose
operations may conflict with those ideologies.80
To exacerbate this issue, the affairs of a corporation are regulated by the state in
which it is incorporated: states have the power to define the internal structure of entities
Furthermore, as is the case with other choice of law
incorporated under their laws.'
questions in domestic courts, the incorporating state's law will be applied to issues
concerning the internal structure of the corporation no matter where an action against it is
brought8 2 This doctrine is largely justified by the ideology of territorial sovereignty,
indicating that it is solely within the jurisdiction of the incorporating state make decisions
concerning its corporations' internal affairs.83 State courts have accepted the internal affairs
doctrine ("IAD") as a given,84 yet the Supreme Court has never ruled on its constitutionality
and has only addressed the IAD in dicta.85
Critics of the IAD have pointed to three flaws in this doctrine in corporate law.8 6
First, the IAD eliminates choice of law rules where states would normally apply their own
87
law to actions arising from citizens and economic activity within its jurisdiction. Second, it
allows a corporation to cherry-pick the laws by which it wishes to abide, unlike natural

n See Greenfield, supra note 29, at 35 (indicating that in response to New Jersey's relaxation of corporate laws
in 1889, states "were forced to remove many of their own restraints on corporations... doing away with more
and more regulatory limitations on the corporate form intended to protect the public.").
' Id.; see also, Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1443 (noting that New Jersey's adoption of liberal corporation
statutes in 1896 attracted several large corporations and that subsequent restrictive amendments made in 1913
caused New Jersey to lose the role as home to the largest businesses of the time).
79 See id. at 1442 (noting that this analysis pertains to publicly traded companies; close corporations adhere to a
different decision-making process and require a different analysis).
'o See Greenwood, supra note 74, at 387 (explaining how New Jersey fell out of favor with corporations in the
early 1900s because of the reform movement's influence on the state's legislature).
8' See Bebchuck, supra note 17, at 1438.
12 Deborah DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP,
PROBS. 161 (1985); Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP.
L. 33, 36 (2006) ("The widespread acceptance of this doctrine enables a firm to incorporate under the law of
any state, knowing its choice will be respected elsewhere.").
1 Tung, supra note 82, at 48.
84 See McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215-16 (Del. 1987) ("[A]pplication of the internal affairs
doctrine is not merely a principle of conflicts of law. It is also one of scrious constitutional proportions . . . .").
'5 See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin., 500 U.S. 90, 106 (1991); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46
(1982);
86 See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets and Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L.
REV. 41, 62 (2005) [hereinafter Markets and Democracy].
" Id. at 62.
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persons, regardless of location or relationship." Third, the IAD forces state legislators to
compete with one another to attract corporate charters.89
D. FiduciaryDuties and the ShareholderProfit-MaximizingNorm

While corporations were originally conceived for the purpose of serving public
benefits, modem corporations are managed in order to satisfy shareholder interests, simply
because they are the owners of the corporation.o "Under this view, directors are trustees of
the shareholder's property, and, therefore, have a duty, first and foremost, to increase
shareholder wealth." 9' Public corporations are not "public" in the sense of having
responsibilities to society, or of being owned by the community, or of being subject to
particularly stringent public oversight. "In fact, managers of most large, 'public' companies
are prohibited by law from taking into account the interests of the public when making
decisions, if in so doing those of the company's shareholders are harmed. ,92
Among the greatest challenges to corporate social responsibility in the United States
is the law's basic position on the purpose of the corporation and how the fiduciary duties of
corporate directors must adhere to this principle. This was most famously articulated in the
case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.," which established what is known as shareholder-value or
the wealth-maximization norm.94 At the beginning of the 20th century, Ford Motor Company
was one of the dominant manufacturers of automobiles in the United States. 95 The company
had a policy of reducing automobile prices to make the vehicles more affordable for
customers.96 The company issued quarterly dividends to its shareholders, and, in 1911, it also
began to issue special dividends to shareholders.
In July 1916, Ford, addressing the
financial condition of the company, altruistically 98 stated that it would stop paying these
Id. at 62-63. Professor Greenwood has analogized this privilege of corporations as the equivalent of families
choosing to follow whichever state's family law is most favorable: "No American state allows families to
choose to follow the child protection law of another state just because the family decision maker thinks that law
better. By accepting the internal affairs doctrine [states] give corporations precisely that right." Id.
8 Tung, supra note 82, at 41. The ability of corporations to shop for favorable laws has been considered the
"genius of American corporate law." Id. The system of state charter competition encourages corporations to
"circumvent or minimize the effect of political constraints on economic development . . . [this system] reduces
the number of extraneous regulations that must be bypassed." Id. The IAD, therefore, can be viewed as a
predictable result of allowing the free market to be left to its own devices and the byproduct of uninterested
market participants' "inexorable march to efficiency." Id.
9 Marshall M. Magaro, Note, Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving CorporateSocial Responsibility Through the
Shareholder-PrimacyNorm, 85 IND. L. J. 1149, 1149, 1154 (2010).
98

' Id. at 1149.
92 GREENFIELD, supranote 29, at 1.

9" 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).

4 Throughout this note, terms such as "wealth-maximization," "profit-motive," and "shareholder-centric" are
used interchangeably in reference to this concept of shareholder value.
9s See generally Ford Motor Company Incorporated, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/ford-motor-company-incorporated (last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
9 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 670. The car manufactured by Ford Motor Company originally sold for more than
$900. Id. This selling price was periodically reduced and improvements were made to the car, which sold for
only $440 in July 1916. Id.
"

Id.

9' Commentators note that Henry

Ford's motives were not entirely "altruistic." Randall K. Justice, The Duty of
CorporateDirectorsto Pay Dividends, 87 KY. L.J. 231, 247 (1999) (noting the court's finding that Ford was
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special dividends and that the company's resources would be used instead to expand its
business so as to benefit employees and customers." In Henry Ford's own words, "My
ambition is to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the
greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this, we
are putting the greatest share of our profits back into the business." 00 True to his word,
Henry Ford pursued costly opportunities aimed at expanding Ford's operations and sharing
the rewards of his enterprise with employees and customers.' 0 ' Ford also ceased paying out
dividends to its shareholders.' 0 2
Brothers John F. Dodge and Horace E. Dodge-owners of ten percent of Ford
Motor Co.'s capital stock-filed suit in the circuit court in the county of Wayne, Michigan
against the company. 0 3 Their complaint sought to enjoin defendant, Ford Motor Company,
from pursuing its proposed expansions and asked the court to order the company to resume
issuing dividends to its shareholders. 4 The complaint alleged that the proposed expansions
were reckless, and that they threatened to seriously jeopardize plaintiff-stockholders'
interests.05 Henry Ford defended his position; showing that the operational expenditures
were great and that the company's requirement for cash was enormous, Ford demonstrated
that, if the company were to experience a sudden collapse of business, a significant amount of
money would need to be available just to remain in business.'" The court noted that:
This defendant is opposed to any policy which would necessitate the discharge
of large number of employ~s [sic] in case there should be a sudden depression
of business if there be any way to avoid it, and .

.

. believes that the latter

methods and policies ultimately redound to the best financial interests of the

motivated to withhold dividends to prevent shareholders from profiting from their investment). A lesser-known
fact about the issues in Dodge v. Ford is that the Dodge brothers, original shareholders in the Ford Motor
Company, had decided to go into businesses in competition with Ford Motor Co. D. Gordon Smith, The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 316 (1998). They attempted to sell their shares in Ford to
finance their business, but Ford refused to purchase them. Id. The shares in Ford Motor, however, continued to
supply the Dodge brothers with capital to finance their operations. Id. Ford's refusal to declare special
dividends in 1916, a year in which the company experienced record profits, was a measure taken, in part, to
deprive the Dodge brothers of revenue necessary to fund their business. Id. at 315.
* See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671.
in Id. (internal quotations omitted).
]01 Id.
02 id.

03 Id. at 670-71.
'
1s

Id. at 673.
Id.

o Id. at 676-77. The great depression hit years later, and many people were laid off. See Philip Scranton,
(Apr.
2,
2012,
11:
07
AM),
Depression
Car,
BLOOMBERG
Henry
Fords
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-02/henry-ford-s-depression-car.html.
Pressured by competition,
Ford sought to create models with more powerful engines while keeping prices significantly lower than his
competitors. Id. Auto experts indicated that manufacturing a reliable, inexpensive eight-cylinder vehicle
would be impossible, particularly in light of parts and labor costs. Id. Nonetheless, in 1932 Henry Ford told
Time that he was ready to "risk everything we've got to create useful work for just as many people as possible."
Id. The new models were rushed hastily to the market, and Ford's production was overwhelmed. Id. Due to
delays and breakdowns, the company lost about $75 million that year. Id. Unfazed, Henry Ford was reported
to have said that the money was not wasted because it went towards paying workers and taxes. Id. "'We didn't
lose it-we used it,' he said. 'If We had dropped it on the stock market, that would have been losing it."' Id.
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company and its stockholders. [He] is not in favor of paying out in dividends
the surplus of the company to the danger point or any point where it could be
regarded as risky in the least degree . . . [and] further shows that he is not in

favor of keeping up the price of the car to the highest possible point that the
public will apparently stand for the time being, but he is in favor of the policy
of reducing the price of the car from time to time as the safety and welfare of
the company and stockholders will dictate, since he believes such to be a
better, permanent policy for the company. Such always has been the policy
adopted in the past, and he believes that such has been one of the causes of the
unexampled success of the company., 0 7
The court, however, agreed with the plaintiffs contention that defendant's altruism
was improper, declaring that "a business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The discretion of the directors is to be exercised in the choice of
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, the reduction of
profits, or the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other
purposes." os Furthermore, the court stated, "[l]t is not within the lawful powers of a board of
directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of
shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others."'"
Ford was ordered to
resume paying dividends to its shareholders for failing to pursue shareholder wealth
maximization.
The holding in Dodge stands for the proposition that the purpose of a
corporation is to maximize its profits for its investors, and that a director breaches his
fiduciary duties to shareholders when his priorities are otherwise."'
In many ways, this shareholder-centric view on corporate purpose loses sight of the
goals that states sought to achieve by granting corporate charters in the first place, as listed in
Part I of this Note. As discussed, states are motivated to seek corporate charters to promote
social as well as economic stability within its borders-these benefits are not merely
incidental from the states' point of view. A state and its citizens are stakeholders in corporate
activity. Those employed by the corporation tend to be citizens of the state in which it is
incorporated; in many situations, the corporation harvests local resources and transacts with
local businesses. Furthermore, the consequences of corporate activity are often realized by
those living within the proximity of where such activity is conducted. Ford recognized this
when he defended his actions by arguing that catering to customer and employee interests
better served the corporation, and its shareholders, in the long run.

107
0o

'

Dodge, 170 N.W. at 676-77.
Id. at 684.
Id.

"0 Id. at 685.

". See id. It should be noted that the court did not enjoin Ford from his proposed expansions. Case Law oin
the Fiduciary Duties of Directors to Maximize the Wealth of Corporate Shareholders,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM

(May

5,

2012),

http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/casc-law-on-the-fiduciary-duty-ofdirectors-to-maximize-the-wealth-of-corporate-sharcholders.html#_ftn 1. The decision does not hold that
directors breach their fiduciary duties to sharcholders by merely considering the social impact of the
corporation's conduct, nor that court's will interfere with director judgments so as to ensure that each decision
is geared towards wealth-maximization. Id. Such decisions arc protected under the Business Judgment Rule.
Id. The holding does, howcycr, stand for the proposition that directors may not use their judgment in dirccting
corporate actions for the purpose of social benefits at the expense of shareholder wealth maximization. Id.
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In later holdings, courts appeared to indicate that director decisions geared towards
enhancing social benefits might be protected if they were likely to directly benefit the
corporation and its shareholders. In Shlensky v. Wrigley," 2 the plaintiff filed a stockholder
derivative suit against the directors of Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., owner of the
Chicago Cubs and operators of their home stadium, Wrigley Field. The complaint charged
defendants with negligence and mismanagement in refusing to schedule games at night,
which affected shareholder profits.'' 3 The defendant had argued that night games could lead
to the deterioration and decrease in property values of the neighborhoods surrounding
Wrigley Field.'1 4 The court held that, "in the absence of a clear showing of dereliction of
duty on the part of specific directors," courts will not "require [directors] to forego their
business judgment because of the decisions of directors of other companies.""s In A.P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,' the court was presented with a shareholder challenge to a
corporate decision to donate money to Princeton University. The court held that charitable
donations are a permissible exercise of director authority, provided that the donation benefits
the corporation in some way," 7 and the amount donated is reasonable." 8
While these holdings demonstrate that courts will protect the altruistic conduct of a
director under the business judgment rule, there must be some indicia that the decision also
benefits the corporation, and thus shareholders.' 19 Because these decisions must be justified
as a benefit to the corporation, the wealth-maximization or "profit-motive" prevails in state
corporate law today. This view illustrates the law's perspective that shareholder interests take
priority over stakeholder interests wherever the two are at odds with one another.
The view that the primary purpose of corporations is shareholder wealth
maximization has been a source of controversy and major challenge to inducing corporations
to act socially responsible. Indeed, the popular conception that "corporations are evil" may
very well be traced to this profit-motive standard, as there are those who reason that,
corporate personhood, driven by the profit-motive, creates an institution "untouched by . . .
moral reasoning." 20 After all, it is conceivable that the situations that gave rise to the
egregious human rights violations in Kiobel or the oil spills in the Gulf Coast would be less
frequent if the priorities were structured in such a way that placed the interests of corporate
stakeholders on equal or greater footing as those who have invested money in the venture.
Because the law has enforced the profit-motive standard, advocates of this position argue,
"The problem isn't when corporations go wrong. The problem is when they go right."'21
"1 237 N.E.2d 776 (111.
App. Ct. 1968).
" Id. at 777-78. Plaintiff alleged that the Chicago Cubs were the only team that did not schedule night games
and that other teams scheduled night games so as to maximize attendance and revenue. Id.
'4 Id. at 778.
1 Id. at 776.

98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
The court accepted the president's argument that the contributions were a sound investment; the public
expects corporations to aid philanthropic institutions and that corporations obtain good will by doing so. Id. at
590.
"" Id. In approving the donation, the court noted that it was "modest in amount." Id.
116
1

Il See

Jay

Michaelson,

Are

Corporations

Evil?,

JEWISH

DAILY

FORWARD

(July

28,

2010),

http://forward.com/articles/129678/are-corporations-evil/#ixzz2J5IB8HXG ("Even when corporations give
money to charity, or choose an ethical way of doing business, they are required to justify the decision by saying
that it'll ultimately pay off financially, perhaps in the form of increased sales or of realizable goodwill.").
20 Id.
121Id.
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Some critics point out that the shareholder-value norm, in prioritizing shareholder
interests over all else, actually harms investors. In her new book Lynn Stout, Professor of
Corporate and Securities Law at UCLA, argues that emphasis on shareholder value causes
corporate executives to abandon long-term performance goals for quick, short-term profits.
She writes that this focus, in addition to undermining social interest, "causes companies to
indulge in reckless, sociopathic, and socially irresponsible behaviors . . . . threaten[ing] the
22
Using the 2010 BP
welfare of consumers, employees, communities, and investors alike."
oil-spill as a case study, she points out that, in addition to the eleven fatalities and the
widespread pollution, the spill was a tragedy for the corporation and its investors as well:

By June of 2010, BP had suspended paying its regular dividends, and BP
common stock (trading around $60 before the spill) had plunged to less than
$30 per share. The result was a decline in BP's total stock market value
amounting to nearly $100 billion. BP's shareholders were not the only ones to
suffer. The value of BP bonds tanked as BP's credit rating was cut from a
prestigious AA to the near-junk status BBB. Other oil companies working in
the Gulf were idled, along with BP, due to a government-imposed moratorium
on further deepwater drilling in the Gulf. Business owners and workers in the
Gulf fishing and tourism industries struggled to make a living. Finally, the
Gulf ecosystem itself suffered enormous damage, the full extent of which
23
remains unknown today.
Professor Stout reports that the executive decision to forego adequate safety
procedures was saving BP one million dollars per day.124 This risky decision, however, ended
up costing the shareholders alone nearly $100 billion.'2 The book argues, much like Henry
Ford, that shifting the focus of corporate purpose to serve stakeholder interests would benefit
corporations, shareholders, and society in general in the long run.126
Conversely, there are those who take the position that "the idea that companies have
a responsibility to act in the public interest and will profit from doing so is fundamentally
flawed," and support this argument by pointing out that, when public social interests conflict
with private profit-maximization interests, corporations will pursue the latter.12 7 Furthermore,
even when corporations do act socially responsible, it is not out of consideration or obligation
12 8
In such
to public interests but, rather, the result of public and corporate interests aligning.
cases, some people argue, corporate social responsibility becomes irrelevant because the
29
corporation is still operating under the profit-seeking motive.' A good example is the hybrid
car, which came into existence largely in response to environmental concerns engendered by

122 STOUT, supra
2

note 6, at vi.

Id. at 1-2.

124 Id. at 2.
25

Id.

26

See id. at 6.

127 Ancel Karnani,

The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI0001424052748703338004575230112664504890.
128Id.

12 Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol13/iss1/5

206

16

Coleman and Friedler: The Road to Reform in the Wake of <i>Kiobel</i>: Multinational Co
THE ROAD TO REFORM IN THE WAKE OF KIOBEL

greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles.13 0 When the Toyota Prius, a type of hybrid
car,' 3 ' was first introduced into U.S. markets in 2000, ownership of the vehicle was perceived
as more of a novelty, and sales paled in comparison to larger, less fuel-efficient vehicles.'3 2
Over the past decade, however, with the emergence of greater environmental consciousness
and rising gas prices, demand for the vehicle has increased drastically. 33 In addition to fueleconomy incentives, nations set on reducing greenhouse gas emissions such as the United
States and Japan offer government subsidies and tax credits for Prius owners. 3 4 In the first
quarter of 2012, the Toyota Prius sold 247,230 units.'13 In that year, nearly 50,000 Priuses
were registered in California alone.' 36 Between 2008 and 2010, before natural disasters in
Japan disrupted Toyota's global production and deliveries, the company ranked as the world's
number one automaker. 3 7
The convergence of factors such as environmental consciousness, rising costs of
fuel,
tax incentives, and tighter budgets has initiated an industry trend towards more ecofriendly vehicles.'3 9
Toyota's success with the Prius has inspired other automobile
manufacturers to follow suit; many now offer multiple forms of hybrid vehicles.14 0 A recent
survey indicated that two-thirds of consumers expect that the next vehicle they buy will offer

130 See generally Bradly Berman, When Old Things Turn Into New Again, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
24, 2007),

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/automobiles/autospecial/24history.html?_r=0.
131 Unlike vehicles with conventional power trains, Toyota's Prius combines electricity
and gas-powered
engines to optimal fuel economy. David Schepp, Toyota Prius Hits Million-Sale Milestone in U.S., DAILY FIN.
(Apr. 6, 2011, 4:15 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/04/06/toyota-prius-hits-million-sale-milcstone-us/.
132 See
Brad Tuttle,
Toyota
Prius: Niche
Car No More, TIME,
May
29,
2012,
http://business.time.com/2012/05/29/toyota-prius-niche-car-no-more/ (indicating that, while the U.S. sold out
of its initial production run of 12,000 cars in 2000, that number was small in comparison to the amount of
SUVs being sold at the time).
I33d.
134 Schepp, supra note 131.

1 Alan Ohnsman & Yuki Hagiwara, Toyota Prius Escapes Niche Surge Into Global Top Three, BLOOMBERG
(May 29, 2012, 4:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-29/toyota-prius-escapes-niche-to-surgeinto-global-top-three.html.
131 Justin Ewers, Climbing Gas Prices Can't Slow Down California s Auto Sales. CAL. EcON. SUMMIT (Oct.
19, 2012), http://www.cacconomy.org/reporting/entry/climbing-gas-prices-cant-slow-down-califomias-autosales (noting that high gas prices in California explained consumer preference for the hybrid).
137 Ohnsman & Hagiwara, supra note 135.
13' The authors of this Note point out that, domestically, gas prices in 2008 were at record highs and the United
States had just entered a recession. See Weekly U.S. All Grades All Formulations Retail Gas Prices, EIA,
http://www.cia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=EMMEPMO PTENUSDPG&f=W
(last
visited Dec. 26, 2013).
'39 See Schcpp, supra note 131 (noting that, with the success of the Prius, Toyota has "put the stake in the
ground that everyone else is now scrambling around."). Nonetheless, the Ford F-Scries pick-up truck once
again topped sales charts in the United States, and the demand for vehicles with high greenhouse gas emissions
is still in force. Cars.com, Kicking the Tires, Top 10 Best-Selling Cars: August 2012, WASH. POST, Sept. 4,
2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/kicking-tires/post/top- 10-best-selling-cars-august2012/2012/09/04/e3703c I -f6c5-leIl-a93b-7185c3f88849 blog.html.
140Brad Tuttle, Hyrbid-Car Competition Heats Up: Does the Toyota Prius Finally Have a Worthy
Challenger?, TIME, Feb. 5, 2013, http://business.time.com/2013/02/05/hybrid-car-competition-heats-up-doesthe-toyota-prius-finally-have-a-worthy-challenger/.
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better fuel economy,' 4 ' and even non-hybrid vehicles are being developed with this in

mind.142

While use of vehicles with lower green house gas emissions may have been the
socio-environmental result desired, to say that Toyota and other manufacturers were
motivated to create them primarily by environmental concerns would likely be a
misconception. The same could be said of consumer's motivation to buy these vehicles,
which created the demand for them. At least one consumer report indicated that on a list of
reasons why consumers would by a hybrid vehicle, lower fuel costs ranked number one,
outranking the environmentally friendly responses by at least 27%.,43 Additionally, sales of
hybrid vehicles-which tend to have a higher price tag than strictly gas-powered
vehiclesl 44-tend to rise and fall with the price people pay at the pump.1 45 This demonstrates
that people, like corporations, are also driven by the profit motive and will prioritize their own
welfare above the collective. Given these facts, it requires no leap in logic to justify the
conclusion that rising gas prices and tighter budgets were major factors contributing to the
success of the hybrid vehicle.
Those who claim that corporate social responsibility is an illusion attribute the
success of the hybrid vehicle to the profit-maximizing incentive that motivates most
successful companies. They view the rise of the hybrid car as a response to an economic
demand that fortuitously coincided with environmental benefits.146 This argument supports
the notion that corporations are not, in fact,.evil. They are merely amoral and highly
responsive to market forces. Under this line of reasoning, corporate conduct is a mirror image
of consumer behavior. When consumers, who are driven by their own profit-motive, value
something, the company that offers it to them will be rewarded for doing so. From this
perspective, corporate decisions made in consideration of social benefits are merely a
fortunate byproduct of a system that typically goes the other way. Advocates of this position
point out that, when corporate profits and public social interests are in opposition to one
another, directors are unlikely to act against the interests of their shareholders. In fact, they
141
may risk legal sanctions or even their jobs by doing so.

'' Jeff Bartlett, Survey: Car Shoppers Want Better Fuel Economy, Here 's Why, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG.
(Feb. 4, 2013, 12:23 PM), http://news.consumerreports.org/cars/2013/02/2013-car-brand-perception-survcycar-shoppers-want-better-fucl-cconomy-heres-why.html.
142 See
Brad Tuttle, How the Heck are SUV Sales Hot Again?, TIME, May 18, 2012,
http://business.time.com/2012/05/18/how-the-hcck-are-suv-sales-hot-again/ (noting that fuel inefficient models
such as the Hummer and the Excursion arc no longer being manufactured and that "[t]he fastest-growing SUVs
are what might be called anti-Hummers: small, remarkably fuel-efficient SUVs such as the Honda CR-V, Ford
Escape, and the new Mazda CX-5).
14 Bartlett, supra note 141.
'" See
Hybrids
and
Diesels:
Do
They
Save
Money?,
CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG,
http://consumcrreports.org/cro/2012/01/hybrids-diescls-do-they-save-money/index.htm
(last updated Feb.
2012).
's See id.; Ohnsman & Hagiwara, supra note 135 (quoting independent analyst, John Wolkonowicz, who
specializes in automotive history, as saying that Toyota Prius sales rise and fall in tandem with gas prices).
' See Kamani, supra note 127.
14 See id. (noting that corporate executives are elected to their office by shareholders who hire them to
maximize profits and that "[t]he movement for corporate social responsibility is in direct opposition, in such
cases, to the movement for better corporate governance, which demands that managers fulfill their fiduciary
duty to act in the shareholders' interest or be relieved of their responsibilities").
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The modem corporation is largely the result of two events: first, the adoption of
general incorporation statutes, and, second, the widespread acceptance of the shareholder
profit-maximizing norm. As mentioned above, the decision of state legislatures to stray away
from independent and specific grants of corporate charters was largely the result of the belief
that private enterprise is good for society.' 4 8 In addition, the shift to the profit-maximizing
norm was founded largely on the acceptance of the Milton Friedman's belief that, the free
market, the foundation of our economic system, depended on the protection of shareholders'
proprietary interest in the corporation. 4 9
E. The Unique Dynamics ofMultinational Corporations

From a historical perspective, globalization began when the first movement of
people left Africa for other parts of the world, bringing their customs and ideas with them. ISO
The trade of goods and services, if not the purpose for these migrations, was often a
byproduct of them. Indeed, the European colonization of North America can be traced back to
Christopher Columbus' royally sanctioned search for greener pastures and trade
opportunity.' 5' Transnational business is nothing new. Though the basic concept has not
changed over time, modem modes of transportation and communication allow for quicker,
more effective trade of ideas and goods. While some view the increase of transnational
business interactions as facilitating a destructive interdependence among nations, others see
great potential in the transnational exchange of goods and ideas.' 52 While both positions are
amply supported, the fact remains that globalization is a practice as old as man and business is
booming on the transnational stage. Furthermore, the corporation's role is growing:
"Increasingly, the scale and complexity of modem business activity demand that it be
conducted in corporate form rather than by individual entrepreneurs. . . .On an international
level, business activity tends to be even more complex and to demand even larger
aggregations of capital, equipment and skill."'
Indeed, the challenges to corporate law are exacerbated when placed in the
international context, where what may seem commonplace domestically may be handled
differently abroad. Take, for example, the rights of domestic firms incorporated in one state

"4 See supra Part I. See CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 18, at 3, for a discussion on the rationale for the social
value of increasing private enterprise, namely that "every business was of public importance in the respect that
it might increase the aggregate wealth of society."

"

MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133

(4

0

h' Anniversary

ed. 2002) ("Few

trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate
officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for stockholders as possible.").
'io History of Globalization, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/about/history.jsp (last visited

Dec. 30, 2013).
BRITANNICA,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
Columbus,
IJ.
Flint,
Christopher
See
Valerie
(last visited Dec. 26, 2013)
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/127070/Christopher-Columbus
(indicating that the journey that led Christopher Columbus to the Americas was primarily motivated by the
"Christian missionary and anti-Islamic fervour . . . the lust for gold, the desire for adventure, the hope of
conquests, and Europe's genuine need for a reliable supply of herbs and spices for cooking, preserving, and
medicine.").
152Globalization,supra note 150.
151

"' VAGTS, supra note 36, at 98.
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to sue in other states. In Bank of Augusta v. Earle,154 the defendant in error argued that a
corporation must "necessarily be incapable" of contracting outside of the limits of the state of
its incorporation because (1) the "laws of a state can have no extra-territorial operation" and
(2) "a corporation is the mere creature of a law of the state." 55 Rejecting this argument, the
Court held that a corporation of a foreign state is permitted to file a legal action outside of the
limits of its state of incorporation due to the applicability of the doctrine of comitytraditionally a principle of international law-to the domestic dispute.156
While U.S. domestic law eventually developed to recognize the legal existence of
foreign corporations, whether from other states or from other countries, for the purpose of
bringing a law suit, the same cannot always be said of foreign nations. 57 For example,
France will only permit a foreign corporation to file suit in France provided that the
corporation's country of incorporation grants that right, or a treaty grants that right.'58 But
where no such treaty exists or comity is lacking, a foreign corporation may experience
difficulty in having its rights recognized by the nation in which it wishes conduct business. 59
An international setting complicates internal corporate regulation and the source of
and goals for CSR. Even though MNCs can be credited for creating local jobs and taxable
revenues, any attempt to measure the true impact of MNCs on local economies must also
include other factors that the influx ofjobs and tax revenues often overshadow. For example,
profits from MNC activity are rarely kept in the host country but, rather, are brought into the
country in which the MNC is headquartered. "o This is problematic where a number of large
MNCs generate more revenue than the GDP of some major nations, gained by activity that
imposes large social and environmental costs on host nations and the people who live there.
Using Kiobel as an example, the fact that opposition by locals affected by oil-production
efforts in Nigeria has become militant may be good evidence that the socio-environmental
burdens imposed on a host nation are not justified by the economic benefits brought by
MNCs.
The economic status of host nations, some of which are developing third-world
countries, also frustrates attempts to encourage corporate social responsibility. Here, the raceto-the-bottom theory has dire implications for nations desperate for economic growth. In
nations where minimum wages are much lower than the domestic average, MNCs are in a

" 38 U.S. 519 (1839) (action on a bill of exchange brought by a Georgia corporation against an Alabama
defendant).

" Id. at 588.
56 Id. at 590 ("The intimate union of [the States], as members of the same great political family ...
[and] the
deep and vital interests which bind them so closely together .. . should lead us, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, to presume a greater degree of comity, and friendship, and kindness toward one another, than we
should be authorized to presume between foreign nations.").
1" See VAGTS, supra note 36, at 101.
158 Id. ("Modem treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation typically guarantee that right [to sue].").
15 Notably, even where nations have such agreements, the laws of the nation in which the MNC operates often
differ from the laws of the nation that granted its corporate charter, bringing it into existence.

'6

BRETT LEE BILLETT, INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN DEVELOPING AREAS

66(1991).
161 See Vincent Trivett, 25 US Mega Corporations: Where They Rank If They Were Countries, BUS. INSIDER
(June

27,

2011,

I1:27

AM),

http://www.businessinsider.com/25-corporations-bigger-tan-countrics-2011-6?op=l#ixzz2L7boHiHh
(indicating that Wal-Mart's revenues are "on par with the GDP of the 25th largest economy in the world
surpassing 157 smaller countries").
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position to save large sums of money in operational expenses.162 Furthermore, MNCs can use
their economic influence to exploit relaxed social and environmental regulations enacted by
corrupt governments desperate to retain their business.'16
Finally, the physical distance
between the nations where MNCs manufacture goods and the nations where the goods are
sold reduces local consumer awareness of the magnitude of these problems or, worse yet, that
these problems even exist."" As a result, behavior that might otherwise be checked at the
cash register is reinforced by consumerism instead.
Ill. Re-examining the "Purpose" of the Corporation
Private enterprise, if wielded appropriately, offers tremendous value; "[c]orporations
are so powerful that '[n]o social program can rival the business sector when it comes to
creating the jobs, wealth, and innovation that improve standards of living and social
conditions over time."'" 6 5 Economically, corporations have the capital and purchasing power
to reduce production costs.""' Consumers are the beneficiaries of these savings, which are
reflected in lower market prices. Large corporations directly employ thousands of people in
the communities in which they operate. Indirectly-as large consumers of legal, financial,
Furthermore, those who
and other services-corporations keep other firms in business.
work for larger corporations are more likely to receive fringe benefits and enjoy higher
salaries than those who work in smaller firms. 69 The sheer number of jobs offered by
corporations alleviates the social burdens of unemployment and strengthens the economy.
Additionally, corporations are sources of fee revenues and franchise taxes which may be
distributed for the benefit of the state and its citizens.'vo The corporation's ability to address
state social and economic issues more effectively than other types of organizations derives
from the internal structure and legal privileges bestowed upon it.' 7' While the potential of the

62 GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOYCOTT: LABOR RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND TRANSNATIONAL
ACTIvIsM 25 (2007).
163

Id. at 26-27.

6 Lois A. Mohr, Deborah J. Webb, & Katherine E. Harris, Do Consumers Expect to be Socially Responsible?
The hinpact of 'Corporate Social Responsibility on Buying Behavior, 35 J. CONSUMER AFF. I, 48 (2001).
165 Magaro, supra note 90, at 1149 (quoting Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy
& Society: The
Link Between Competitive Advantage and CorporateSocial Responsibilitv, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78,
83).
166 See Thaddeus Herrick, Chevron Texaco's Merger Savings Could Be as Much as $2.2 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 20, 2001, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1024517949553199000.htmil. Chevron's 2001 (and 35.1 billion
dollar) acquisition of Texaco reportedly cut the firms' combined costs by greater than $1.8 billion annually).
Id. "The[sc] savings came from consolidating operations and eliminating redundant costs." RICHARD A.
BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 873 (8th ed. 2006)
(discussing economics of scale, and how they reduce the operational costs of large, multinational enterprises).
67 Brian Roach, Social and Environmental Responsibilitiy of Corporations, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL
(2007),
ECONOMICS
IN
ISSUES
http://www.cocarth.org/article/Social and-environmental-rcsponsibility of corporations.
68 See Bcbchuk, supra note 17, at 1443 ("Incorporations ... provide patronage for local law firms, corporation
service companies, and other businesses.").

1'9 Roach, supra note 167.

Bcbchuk, supra note 17, at 1443.
See Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 6
(2008) ("These public supports of corporations are important and valuable.... Corporations provide one of
7o

17'
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corporate form to create "prodigious social wealth"17 2 was the fundamental justification for
states' decision to create these entities by bestowing the special privileges on them,
the
potential harm a corporation can impose upon society may have been considered with
haste. 74 Indeed, the modern corporation often undermines its ability to produce social value,
the very quality rendering it worthy of its special privileged status in the first place. 7 5
Corporations frequently fall short of society's expectations:
They produce costly externalities; they are amoral; they fail to sustain implicit
or explicit commitments to communities; they privilege some stakeholders
(shareholder) at the expense of others (for example, employees). They
manipulate regulatory oversight and exert disproportionate political power;
they compete with other firms to their collective detriment by over-utilizing
resource or fouling the environment; they provide cover for managerial selfdealing of various kinds. They privilege the short-term at the expense of the
long-term. 7 6
The harm corporations impose upon society indicates that, perhaps, these pivotal
decisions to transform corporate law in the interest of increasing social value should have
included necessary procedural protections of the public interest.
As Professor Colombo correctly observes:
The business corporation 'is not inherently bad, although experience has
taught that it can be employed in ways that detract from the common good.'
[Therefore the] challenge of corporate law today-and especially for those
who advocate corporate government reforms and greater social
responsibility-is to find ways to rein in corporate abuses without sacrificing
77
the tremendous benefits of the corporate form.
The ability, and appropriate means, for corporate abuses to be reigned in is directly
dependent upon the relationship between the corporation and society, which is informed by
corporate purpose. Thus, tinkering with corporate purpose can curb corporate abuse.

society's most powerful engines of wealth creation, and the nation as a whole enjoys more abundance because
of them.").
172 Magaro, supra note 90, at 1150.
1 See Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1443.
174 See Magaro, supra note 90, at
1150.
1" Id. ("While corporations are powerful machines capable of creating prodigious societal wealth, they an also
run off course and cause great societal harm.").
76

Kent Greenfield, Proposition:Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L. J. 948, 951 (2008)

[hereinafter Proposition:Saving the World with CorporateLaw]. See STOUT, supra note 6, for examples of the
economic, social, and environmental harm caused by corporate shortcomings. Particularly, "The past dozen
years have seen a daisy chain of costly corporate disasters, from massive frauds at Enron, HealthSouth, and
Worldcom in the early 2000s, to the near-failure and subsequent costly taxpayer bailout of many of our largest
financial institutions in 2008, to the BP oil spill in 2010." Id. at 5.
17 Colombo, supra note 23, at 289.
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A. The Relationship Between Corporationsand Society: Why CorporatePurpose
Matters

The purpose of a corporation directly relates to its role in society. The need to
establish the extent of corporations' obligations to society is grounded in the reality that their
actions are essentially tied to the inner workings of society, the economy, and government. 78
Therefore, the purpose of incorporation must be precisely defined before a state, by means of
corporate law, or the federal government, by means of regulatory legislation, can properly
implement a framework to induce the desired effects of the corporate endeavor-namely, to
induce corporate behavior in line with its perceived role in society.
These questions concerning the role of the corporation in society refer to questions
about corporations' "social responsibility." This Note refers to CSR as the inherent
obligations of corporations, whether voluntarily satisfied or mandated by law, as a result of
corporations' relationship to society. This concept of CSR refers to all duties owed beyond
the sale of goods and services by corporations.179 This definition is in stark contrast to the
typical attempts to define CSR in the academic field, which usually define "some" of the
duties owed based on various points of reference. (The most common sources used to validate
lists of "partial duties" are voluntary moral obligation, long-term profit maximization, and
even arguments for government regulation.) This take on the concept of CSR excludes the
additional variable of the source of the obligation (moral, self-interested profit maximizing, or
legal) to more socially responsible behavior.
Questions concerning from where a
corporation's obligation of socially responsible behavior is often a source of intense debate
and confusion. Removing this variable is therefore immensely valuable to the present
discussion, which examines the nature of the corporation's relationship with society as
opposed to discussing the best means for enforcing that duty.
To begin, any theory concerning what responsibilities a corporation owes to society
will be upon a scholar's fundamental belief of the nature of state corporate law-in particular,
the question of whether or not corporate law is public or private law. This Part will,
therefore, discuss the public versus private debate of state corporate law and the most relevant
theories (and their attendant justifications and flaws) arising from this distinction, namely the
shareholder primacy model, the stakeholder model, and new perspectives advanced by
scholars recently attempting to reconcile the two aforementioned models.
B. CorporateLaw: Public or PrivateLaw?

As explained above, the historical context surrounding the development of the
corporate form suggests that the original purpose of creating the corporate form was based
upon a corporation's ability to contribute social value and promote the public interest.180
178See Saving the World with Corporate Law, suipra note 176, at 948 ("Large, multinational corporations
are
immensely powerful-affecting investors, workers, governments, communities, and ecosystems the world
over-and the law that governs them creates, channels, and cabins that power."); see also RICHARD N. FARMER
& W. DICKERSON HOGUE, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 5 (2d cd. 1985) (pointing out that corporations
are becoming increasingly powerful and, the bigger they become, the greater their influence they have on
society).
"' See HENRY C. WALLICH, Second Lecture, in THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 37,
39-40 (1972).
18oSee supra Part L.A.
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Presently, however, the mainstream conception of the corporation is to advance one purpose
and one purpose alone: maximizing shareholder profits.'"' The debate over whether state
corporate law is private or public in nature offers insight into how these two conceptions of
corporate purpose have evolved. In the corporate-law-is-private-law camp, corporate law is
considered the result of private citizen contracts that is constitutionally protected and,
therefore, beyond the reach of the government to impose restrictions on purpose (and, in
particular, restrict the corporate purpose to purposes serving the public interest).182 In
contrast, the corporate-law-is-public-law camp argues that corporations are "artificial social
constructions that owe their existence entirely to positive acts of legislation" and, as a result, a
state legislature possesses the power to define the internal structures of the entity it grants
special privileges to and modify those rules as it sees necessary to align it with the public
welfare. 183
Ironically, "[t]he ideological fronts are curiously inverted on this issue." 84 "The
conservative side, usually willing to pay tribute to tradition and history, here leans on the
abstract reasoning of the law of contract. The liberal side, usually no great admirer of the
paraphernalia of the past, acknowledges a line of reasoning that has strong historical
overtones." 8 1
The private law of contract is currently the dominant conception of corporate law.' 86
According to Daniel Fischel, corporations are "nothing more than an arena in which suppliers
of capital, labor, services, materials, and other necessary contributions come together to
pursue their own interests through bargain and exchange."' Accordingly, the corporation is
considered to be a product of "private contract" instead of a "creature of the state."' 88 This
result obviates arguments for CSR because "corporations were only an embodiment of private
arrangement, they were seen as 'incapable of having social or moral obligations much in the
same way that inanimate objects are incapable of having these obligations.'" 89
Proponents for contract views of the corporation justify the transformation of
corporate law from public to private in nature with examples such as reduced state
involvement in incorporation procedures, the broad powers expressed in charters, and the

Lynn Stout, HBR Blog Network, Why Do Corporations Need a Single Purpose, HARV. Bus. REV. (May 29,
2012, 5:14 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/05/whydocorporations_nced a sin.html (arguing that the
conception that corporations must exist only for maximizing shareholder profits is misguided).
82 See GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 29-30 (explaining the dominant, and, in Greenfield's opinion, erroneous
view of corporate law which is premiscd on the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner).
183 William Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil: The commensurability of Corporate Profits and Hanian Rights,
26 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 141, 189 (2012).
181

84

WALLICH, supra note 179, at 37.

s85Id.

116See GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 30.

This is known as the "nexus-of-contracts" interpretation of
corporate law, which is founded on the belief that corporations are simply the result of many contracts between
the participating parties. Id. This view can be considered a "vehemently private view of the corporation"
stripping it of all public qualities. Id. ("The contractual model sees the corporate form not as a juridical legal
person created by the legislature but a legal form created through a multitude of private contractual
relationships.").
1'* Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273-74 (1982).
88 See id. ("Because the corporation is a particular type of firm formed by individuals acting voluntarily and
for their mutual benefit, it can far more reasonably be viewed as the product of private contract than as a
creature of the state.").
"' GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 30.
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widely utilized and accepted manipulation of different organizational forms for tax and
limited liability purposes.190 "The very term 'corporation' is no longer descriptive of the
uncorporeal shell that is being brought into the world,"19' but simply, a "private transaction or
set of transactions in the market, to which only restitutive, non-distributive, justice issue

apply."

92

With regard to the CSR of the corporation, the creation of private contractual
relationships within the corporation "occupy a prelegal, prepolitical, and perhaps even superconstitutional status[,]"' 93 which insulates the corporation from politics and concerns of the
public interest.' 94 Instead, the responsibility of the corporation is limited to the "rights and
responsibilities contained within the 'contract' between management and shareholders."' 9 ' A
corporation's decision to act in a way that benefits society should only be born from a selfinterested desire to improve its own status-for example, boosting its reputation.19 To
provide an example of the extent of this 'insulation' from political influence, corporations
searching all corners of the planet for the cheapest (and likely child) labor is considered to be
none of their concern 19 because, as proponents of this view suggest, decisions of the private
company are subject to the market and the market only. 98
In contrast to the private-contract model of corporate law, many legal scholars argue
These critics, like Professor Kent
that corporate law is inherently public in nature.'9
Greenfield, criticize the private-contract conception of corporate law as an archaic approach
to free market capitalism.20 'He argues that corporate law theorists who attempt to "shield
corporate law from the concerns of the public make the same mistake that the famous-and
famously wrong-1905 Supreme Court case of Lochner v. New York 20' made in constitutional
law."202 Lochner, and the laissez-faire approach, relied on the assumption that markets are
perfect and the government is overstepping its constitutional boundaries by regulating private
contract. 203

190WALLICH,

supranote 179, at 37.

"1 Id.

192Markets and Democracy, supra note 86, at 44.
' GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 32 (explaining proponents of private-contract model believe that "[tlhe
internal affairs of corporations are not, and should not be, subject to the political process:").
"' Id. at 30.
"9

96

Id. at 29.
See HENRY G. MANNE, First Lecture, in THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1,1

(1972).
" See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 32 (describing the contractarian view, with which Greenfield
disagrees).
i" See Markets and Democracy, supra note 86, at 52.
19 See, e.g., GREENFIELD,supra note 29.

* See id. at 29-39.
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a state statute limiting how many hours an employer could allow an

20'

employee to work in a bakery was unconstitutionally intrusive on citizens' right to enter into private contracts).

Lochner was famously overturned by Ferguson v. Skrupa in 1963 and is now accepted as a catastrophically
incorrect assumption that "the common law and the laissez-faire marketplace are prepolitical, neutral, and
insulated from government regulation." GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 29.
202See GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 29; see also Markets and Denocracv, supra note 86, at 44 ("For much
the same reasons that have led us to reject Lochner and laissez-faire generally, the claim that the market for
corporate law is fair or non-coercive must fail.").
2" GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 29.
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The analogy between Lochner and proponents of the private-contract model is based
on the assertion that the market participants, who voluntarily participate in the creation of the
"contractual web" that is the corporation, will negotiate for law that protects their interests. 20 4
This assumption suggests "the economic markets in which corporations participate will
generate the appropriate legal regulation or guidance by their own processes." 205 Since the
era of Lochner, markets have been heavily mediated by market regulation; paradoxically,
however, the proponents of contract theory suggest that firms-acting as markets for
contracts-should be beyond the reach of government interference.206 The days of Lochner
are long in the past, but the arguments for the private contract model are alive and well,207 and
its critics argue that it can only be seen as a veiled attempt to revitalized archaic and longdebunked interpretation of how the free market functions. In sum, "[t]o allow a market-or a
firm recharacterized as a market-to set its own rules is unlikely to reach results satisfactory
to self-governing people. Or so we have presumed since the demise of Lochner."208
Accordingly "[o]ne cannot protect corporate governance from politics on the ground that it
belongs in the private realm any more than Lochner could protect contact law from politics
because it was private law." 209 These attempts, as in Lochner, "exaggerate the importance of
property and contract . . .[and] exaggerate private right at the expense of the public
interest."210
Advocates for the recognition of corporate law as public law argue "corporate law,
just like every other area of common and statutory law, is predicated upon our collective
political decisions about what we want our society to look like."21
The view that
corporations have a social responsibility has "deep roots" in the history of corporate law. 2 12
Furthermore, "the widespread belief that corporations have a special responsibility to society
draws nourishment from the assertion that corporations are creatures of the state, originally

Markets and Democracy, supra note 86, at 52. This assertion assumed that markets are perfect and parties
entering into contracts possess equal bargaining power.
205 Id. at
52.
206 Id.
207See generally Colombo, supra note 23, at 252.
208Markets and Democracy, supra note 86, at 42. Professor Wallich emphasizes the shortcomings of the
marketplace in the following excerpt:
In evaluating the role of the market, the critical issue is not only "how perfect" it is in a
technical sense. Externalities need to be considered. And even in their absence, the
workings of the market may not be what society considers optimal, for instance with
respect to the distribution of income. Through the political process, people may establish
a hierarchy of values different from that which their market behavior brings about. To
take another example, the valuation placed on the future may not be correctly expressed
by the market rate of interest, which, employed as a discount factor, would make the
world of our great-grandchildren worth a great deal less than we may intuitively believe
204

it to be.
WALLICH, supra note 179, at 44.
209 GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 35.
210 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
2" Id. at 37.
212 WALLICH,

supra note 179, at 37; see also GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 35.("In exchange for receiving the
special benefits of incorporation, including limited liability for shareholders, corporations were chartered for
some public purpose.").
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created by act of the sovereign."2' As a result, "[i]f under existing law corporations do not
function to benefit society in an equitable fashion, or if corporations impose too many
externalities upon stakeholders, then the law must yield in the interest of social welfare, and
new laws must be instituted to attenuate corporate pathologies." 2 14 Public-law theorists of
corporate law refer to the current model of private-contract as a "mythology" and must be
adapted to the function it in fact performs in the real world. 215 To render corporate law a
reflection of reality, the public corporation must be recognized for what it truly is: "a public
institution with public obligations." 216
IV. The Road To Reform
In adopting a model of corporate purpose that will lead to more socially responsible
corporations, a system should be geared towards aligning public social interests with private
corporate interests. Such a mechanism involves change in two areas. First, there must be a
degree of external federal regulation of MNC conduct. Second, there must be a change in the
way corporations operate internally, via reform of state corporate law. A workable
implementation of this proposal involves reformation in both areas, as each functioning
independently will not succeed in accomplishing this goal.
In the following discussion, we will first examine the pros and cons of external
regulation as a means to enforce the social responsibilities of corporations. Next, we will
examine that feasibility of reforming state corporate law to alter the internal decision-making
structure in such a way that aligns director and executive decisions with the corporation's
social responsibilities. Finally, we will briefly examine the voluntary compliance system that
can be adopted by corporations as a means of creating all stakeholder-including
shareholder-wealth.
A. External Regulation

External regulation, sometimes referred to as "command and control, is the
imposition of legal obligations on corporations to coerce behavior that is in the public
*
,,217
interests.
Advocates for regulation argue that without any legal accountability,
corporations have no incentive to act in the public interest when doing so undermines profit
maximization. They argue "corporations will not, through their own generosity, internalize

WALLICH, supra note 179, at 39 ("In any event, the issue is not whether the private corporation can or
cannot legitimately be required by society to perform certain functions. In an age when the corporate income
tax rate is 48 percent, it should be obvious that society can make corporations do anything it wants.").
214 Bradford, supra note 183, at 189.
21S Preface to PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, at xiii, xiii (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) ("Our
historical
treatment of the corporation as a public good in the private service can no longer be sustained. Whatever might
have been true in the earlier days of industrialization now clearly is mythology.").
216Al. ("As we turn to a new century, the second century of corporate law, it is necessary to begin to evaluate
the extent to which corporate invention must be adapted to the task it now in fact performs.").
213

211 JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 36 (James Crawford
&

John S. Bell eds., 2006) ("Command and control refers to the imposition of a minimum legislative standard,
which is the backed up by legal sanctions.").
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the external costs of their decisions or keep an eye on the social harms they produce." 218
Here, the only forces likely to induce CSR are deterrents such as negative publicity, which
undermines profit maximization. In such a situation, any socially responsible behavior is the
result of the self-interested pursuit of corporate profits-for example, garnering a better
reputation or attracting the capital of socially responsible investors ("SRIs"). Congress
currently employs external regulation via labor laws, including minimum wage and antidiscrimination practices,2 9 as well as securities regulation, 220 and environmental regulation. 221
Those who oppose external regulation argue "the corporation does not stand apart
from society and functions best when it gets back to basics, when it is freed of government
regulation and constraints and discards social engineering in favor of just plain
engineering."222 Furthermore, some critics of regulation say that imposing legal standards
turns directors' and executives' focus from implementing voluntary programs to attempting to
circumvent the laws. 22 3 However, in light of the catastrophic events outlined in the
introduction of this Note, the results of a system lacking external regulations can clearly be
seen.
While particular external regulation exceeds the scope of this Note, suggestions for
future scholarly research include: (1) recognizing criminal liability for legal entities, (2)
sanctions for green-washing,224 (3) increasing mandatory disclosures under the SEC for topics

such as long-term social and environmental plans and annual CSR disclosures, among others.
B. InternalRegulation

Internal regulation is the manipulation of corporate decision-making mechanisms by
reforming the structural framework of the corporate entity imposed by state corporate law. 225
Advocates for the internal regulation of corporate entities suggest "if we believe that nonshareholder stakeholders need more regulatory protection than they now receive, then it is
foolish and inefficient as a matter of public policy to leave corporate law as an untapped
resource." 226 Internal regulation is arguably more efficient than external regulation because,
GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 134. Professor Grccnficld claims the idea that the law is "the proper vehicle
to make sure corporations both generate broad social wealth and compensate for negative externalitics borders
on the obvious." Id.
219 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012); Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
42 U.S.C. §2000c to -17 (2011).
220 See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-mm (2012).
221 See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012).
222 PETER SCHWARTZ & BLAIR GIBB, WHEN GOOD COMPANIES Do BAD THINGS 96 (1999) (proponents
of this
view argue "that shareholder value is the only value that matters").
223 See Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 69 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 3, 18-23 (2012).
224"A play on 'whitewashing-using white paint to cover over dirt in a superficial or transparent way-the
term 'greenwashing'. . . signifies] insincere, dubious, inflated, or misleading environmental claims." Miriam
A. Cherry & Judd F. Sncirson, Chevron, Greenwashing,and the Myth of "Green Oil Companies, " 3 WASH. &
LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 133, 140-41 (2012) (pointing out the term greenwashing was first coined by
Jay Westerveld in 1986 in response to a hotel's campaign encouraging guests to be environmentally friendly by
reusing towels despite the probable ulterior motive of saving money); see also Miriam A. Cherry & Judd
Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil
Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983 (2011).
225 GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 127.
226 Proposition:Saving the World with Corporate Law, supra note 176, at
974.
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unlike external regulation, which is mostly reactive, internal regulation is "proactive in
addressing issues of social concern....227 Since state corporate law mandates the framework
that corporate decision makers function within, reforming state law can be an efficient means
of inducing CSR from the inside instead of the outside.228 Depending on the standards
imposed by corporate law, "corporate managers would make different decisions. If they were
told they should consider other yalues, they would do so more often. If they were told to treat
employees (or customers, pensioners, local governments, creditors or the biosphere) as
partners rather than opponents, they would do so more often."229 Opponents of internal
regulation are those adopting the private-contract model of corporate law.230 As discussed,
this school of thought adheres to the notion that the internal structure of the corporation is
inherently private and thus beyond the reach of governmental manipulation.
Examples of proposed internal regulatory reform are as follows: (1) extending
directors and executives fiduciary duties to non-shareholder stakeholders who are currently
unprotected by the shareholder profit-maximizing norm, (2) requiring representation of nonshareholder stakeholders on the corporate board of directors, (3) requiring economic, social
and environmental mission statement in corporate charters as a requirement to the documents
that bring corporations into existence, (4) and most importantly, disbanding the internal
affairs doctrine, which otherwise renders these alterations irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
On today's corporate stage, public concerns play second fiddle to wealth
maximization, and a string of precedent supports the theory that socially responsible behavior
is not the primary consideration of corporate actors. Over the past century, the role of the
corporate entity in society has transformed from public benefit to short-term shareholder
primacy-i.e., short-term stock price maximization. With this transformation, corporate
structure and the law that regulates it has left room for the corporation to pose moral and
societal hazards that are at odds with the original purpose of corporations. In most instances,
the degeneration of the corporate form is the result of an exploitation of the special privileges
inherent in the corporate form, which were extended at a time when the corporate form was
designed to serve and advance a social function that benefited the state and its citizens. To
make matters worse, managers, by focusing on short-term stock price, are likely to severely
deter shareholder profit in the long term.
A system of law that fails to adequately punish and even creates incentives for
MNCs to commit egregious environmental and human rights violations is demonstrative of
the present state of social values and priorities. Yet to call the events outlined at the
introduction of this Note tragedies fails to acknowledge that these are the result of adverse
incentives created by consumer choices and deliberate legislation. Where such forces induce
corporate misconduct, an appeal to CSR becomes an unlikely resolution. Instead, a
regulatory regime that incorporates the progressive view that the purpose of the corporation is
to maximize value, not wealth, of all stakeholders would effectively build "public purpose"
into the internal governance of corporations. This would incorporate socially responsible
227
221
229

id.
See Markets and Democracy, supra note 86, at 48.
id.

230 See supra Part Ill.B.
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decision making into the process of doing business and would also do a better job at
maximizing shareholder value than the current shareholder primacy regime.
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